Following the Supreme Court“s decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016), we expected significant False Claims Act litigation over the Act”s materiality standard.“ Such litigation is a direct consequence of Escobar”s holding, which does not limit the implied certification theory to violations of conditions of payment[1] and emphasizes the Act“s ”demanding“ materiality standard.
Escobar
In Escobar, the Court explained that whether a misrepresentation of compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement is material to the Government”s payment decision may depend on several factors.“ These factors include the following:
- Importance (An Objective Test) ” Whether a “reasonable man [acting on the Government”s behalf] would attach importance to [the representation] in determining his choice of action in the transaction.“ at 2003. ”It follows that a reasonable person would not attach importance to a violation that is “minor or insubstantial.”“ Id. at 2003.
- Government Knowledge/Government Treatment of Violations (A Subjective Test) ” Whether the Government knew of a claim“s falsity and nevertheless paid the claim, which would tend to negate a finding of materiality. ”Id.“at 2003.” This argument is also known as the so-called “government knowledge” defense.“ Conversely, ”evidence that the defendant knows that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based on noncompliance“ supports a finding of materiality.” Id.
- Labels Used “ Whether the Government has ”expressly identif[ied] a provision as a condition of payment,“ although such identification is ”relevant but not automatically dispositive.“ Id.”at 2002.
- Essence of the Bargain “ Whether the regulatory, statutory, or contractual violation goes to the ”essence of the bargain.“ Id”at 2003 n.5.
- The violations of the ICB are ”significant“ since they would likely result in five-figure commissions that ”by any measure“ would be a ”significant“ amount of remuneration with the potential to influence recruiters in their decisions about how and who to recruit. This argument appears to respond to Escobar”s demand that actionable violations not be “minor or insubstantial.”“ Read in context, however, this demand requires that violations be significant to the Government; the Government”s focus, therefore, on the significance of remuneration to recruiters is odd.
- The Department of Education considers ICB compliance important, based on two Federal Register entries discussing the negative effects of incentive compensation. Notably, these entries demonstrate only that (unsurprisingly) the Department takes the law itself to be important, not that it places importance on the particular violations at issue.
- The Department of Education“s actions demonstrate materiality. Particularly, the Department has terminated a school”s participation in Title IV funding based on its violation of the ICB.“ Traditionally, the fact that a violation has a remedy other than denial of payment ” like administrative termination of participation “ would weigh against treating the violation as actionable under the FCA.” The Government argued, however, that because termination of participation also terminates eligibility to receive Title IV funds, this termination was evidence of the materiality of ICB violations.“ Additionally, the Government cited instances in which the Department attempted to recover Title IV funds based on ICB violations, as well as instances in which ICB violations have been pursued through FCA actions.
- The Ninth Circuit had previously held that the ICB is an express condition of payment, which after Escobar is still ”relevant“ to the materiality inquiry, but not determinative.
- Compliance with the ICB goes to ”the essence of the bargain“ between the academic institution and the Government for Title IV funds, since the purpose of the ban was to ensure that funds went to students ”enrolled in institutions likely to meet their educational needs and who could repay their loans.“
- The Government argued that materiality does not depend on whether the Government would have actually refused to pay the claim. Such an outcome-dependent materiality standard, the Government argued, was stricter than the natural tendency standard ”reaffirmed“ in the Escobar
- The Government sought to minimize the company”s Government knowledge defense. The Government conceded that Government knowledge of a violation is relevant to materiality, but emphasized that it is not dispositive.“ In support of its argument, the Government suggested that the Government”s inaction, despite actual knowledge of violative conduct, should not undermine a materiality finding because other important considerations, such as public health or safety, may dictate that the Government continue to accept and pay for services.
- The Government argued that the marksmanship requirement went to the ”essence of the bargain“ the Army struck with Triple Canopy for security personnel to protect its military bases.
- Second, the Government contended that Triple Canopy”s violations were not “minor or insubstantial,” noting that none of the guards Triple Canopy supplied to the Army passed the required marksmanship test at any time during the year they served as guards.
- Third and finally, the Government noted the Army“s treatment of its future dealings with Triple Canopy, observing that the Army did not renew its contracts with Triple Canopy and the United States intervened in the Triple Canopy qui tam.