When it comes to liability insurance, the distinction between intentional acts and negligence can have major implications for coverage—especially in cases involving violent conduct. A recent decision from the California Court of Appeal in State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Curtis Diblin, et al., 2025 WL 2837668, - - Cal. Rptr. 3d - - (October 7, 2025), underscores how courts analyze the interplay between intentional torts, negligence, and the meaning of “occurrence” under an insurance policy. It also clarifies when the concurrent cause doctrine does — or doesn’t — apply, offering important takeaways for attorneys, insurers, and policyholders alike.
Monee Gagliardo sued her housemate, Curtis Diblin, for personal injuries she sustained after he struck her multiple times on the head with a mallet. She asserted several causes of action for intentional torts, including gender violence, as well as negligence, and alleged that Diblin acted with malice and intent to injure such that punitive damages were appropriate.
At trial, Diblin admitted to striking Gagliardo, but his expert, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that the behavior resulted from a “hypomanic episode” caused by side effects of his testosterone therapy.
The jury found Diblin liable on two causes of action: (1) the intentional tort of gender violence and (2) negligence. The jury also determined that he acted with malice and oppression, awarding more than $2 million in compensatory damages. Gagliardo waived her claim for punitive damages.
State Farm insured Diblin under a homeowner’s policy that provided coverage for bodily injury caused by an “occurrence,” defined as an accident. State Farm defended Diblin in the underlying action and also filed a declaratory relief action to determine whether it was obligated to indemnify him. The trial court found in favor of State Farm, holding that Diblin’s liability did not arise from an occurrence. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
The Court disagreed with Diblin’s contention that the jury’s finding of negligence was inconsistent with a finding that he acted intentionally. It reasoned that: “a jury could conclude that a person who intentionally injures another person has also failed to use reasonable care to prevent injury to another . . . the defendant did ‘something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation.’” Thus, the fact that Diblin was found to be negligent did not mean his conduct was accidental or unintentional, nor did it require a finding of coverage.
The Court also rejected Diblin’s argument that he was entitled to coverage for negligence under the concurrent independent causes doctrine. In finding the doctrine inapplicable, the Court explained that each risk must operate independently to cause the injury. In this case, however, Diblin’s alleged negligence – his failure to properly manage his medication or warn Gagliardo of the side effects – could not have caused her injuries unless he also acted intentionally and violently to bludgeon her. Thus, Diblin’s negligence was “integrally connected to” his violent conduct and was not independent of it.
The Court’s decision serves as a reminder that not all findings of negligence will trigger insurance coverage—particularly when the negligent conduct is inextricably tied to intentional harm. The case reinforces that, for coverage to apply under a liability policy, the underlying act must qualify as an “accident.” It also narrows the application of the concurrent cause doctrine to situations where each cause can independently result in injury.