In Healy v. Milliman, Inc., — F.4th —-, 2026 WL 71863 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026), the Ninth Circuit addressed a key Article III standing question left open by the Supreme Court in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021) – whether unnamed class members must present at least some evidence of concrete injury on a class-wide basis in opposition to summary judgment.
The action was brought under section 1681e(b) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Milliman, a risk management, benefits, and technology firm based in Seattle, had compiled credit reports containing insurance applicants’ medical history and sold them to insurers. Plaintiff Healy applied for life insurance with one of Milliman’s insurer clients. He alleged Milliman supplied incorrect information to the insurer based on another person’s medical records, which caused his application to be denied, and then failed to timely investigate and correct the errors when notified.
The district court certified an “inaccuracy class” comprised of persons whose Milliman reports contained information pertaining to other individuals. Milliman moved for summary judgment on Healy’s FCRA claim, arguing that a report with some allegedly inaccurate information did not necessarily demonstrate injury. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington agreed, dismissing the claims of the inaccuracy class for failure to establish class-wide standing.
Issue: What is required for named and unnamed class members to establish Article III standing at the summary judgment stage in a Rule 23 class action for damages?
Holding: After class certification, in a class action seeking monetary damages under FRCP 23(b)(3), both named and unnamed class members must present evidence of standing at the summary judgment stage. In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiffs must submit evidence as to both named and unnamed class members showing a genuine dispute of material fact regarding standing.
Application by the Court:
- Notably, the Ninth Circuit panel held that the district court had erred by requiring direct evidence of concrete injury for class-wide standing, thus setting an unduly high bar at summary judgment.
- Instead, the Ninth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs can use either direct or circumstantial evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to standing.
- Plaintiffs need not prove that a jury “necessarily” would find in their favor; they must only show that a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer class-wide standing based on the evidence.
Appellate Outcome:
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment for Milliman, Inc. and remanded for the district court to determine whether the evidence presented (including circumstantial evidence) raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to class member standing. See Healy, 2026 WL 71863, at *7 (“Healy did not need to show that a jury ‘necessarily’ would find that mismatched social security numbers demonstrate misattributed health records. Rather, Healy merely needed to produce enough evidence at summary judgment that a rational trier of fact ‘could’ reasonably infer that this was the case.”).
Practical Takeaway:
For cases within the Ninth Circuit, at summary judgment in a post-certification class action for damages, both named and unnamed plaintiffs must establish—by direct or circumstantial evidence—a material dispute of fact as to Article III standing. As a practical matter, this could put plaintiffs in a bind in opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs may find particular class members for whom a genuine dispute is shown based on the member’s particular facts. But then they may have laid the groundwork for a decertification motion, because common questions of law and act no longer predominate if some class members can demonstrate injury but others cannot.